Shuo Liu

Assistant Professor of Finance

Tsinghua University, School of Economics and Management, China

Email: lsfly0926@gmail.com

CV

Education

  • Ph.D. in Economics, UCLA, 2014-2020

Research Interest

  • Over-the-Counter market

  • Asset Pricing

  • Financial Intermediation

Working papers

Are dealers' search efforts endogeneous in decentralized markets? How do dealers' search efforts affect market efficiency? We propose a model with dealers choosing idiosyncratic search intensities, and estimate the model using transaction data on U.S. corporate bonds. We find that: [1] with dealers ranked by their private valuations for a bond, the middle-type dealer chooses the highest search intensity, and she reallocates bond positions from lower-type dealers to higher-type dealers; [2] the estimated model predicts that the search costs and bond misallocation in current OTC markets generate 13.7% welfare loss relative to a counterfactual frictionless market.

A non-technical summary by Tom Petruno from the UCLA-Anderson Review

We study liquidity conditions in the corporate bond market since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. We find that in mid-March 2020, as selling pressure surged, dealers were wary of accumulating inventory on their balance sheets, perhaps out of concern for violating regulatory requirements. As a result, the cost to investors of trading immediately with a dealer surged. A portion of transactions migrated to a slower, less costly process wherein dealers arranged for trades directly between customers without using their own balance sheet space. Interventions by the Federal Reserve appear to have relaxed balance sheet constraints: soon after they were announced, dealers began absorbing inventory, bid-ask spreads declined, and market liquidity started to improve. Interestingly, liquidity conditions improved for bonds that were eligible for the Fed’s lending/purchase programs and for bonds that were ineligible. Hence, by allowing dealers to unload certain assets from their balance sheet, the Fed’s interventions may have helped dealers to better intermediate a wide variety of assets, including those not directly targeted.

This paper analyzes OTC market participants' endogeneous search intensity in competitive equilibrium and social optimal cases. We develop a random search-and-match model where agents (market participants) are allowed to choose and adjust their search intensities based on two idiosyncratic states: asset position and liquidity need. We find that: [1] in competitive equilibria with different market parameters, agents can switch between the core and periphery on the trading network. [2] it is the social optimal case that there is no intermediation, in the sense that no agent searches at positive speeds on both the buy and sell sides of the market. In competitive equilibrium, there always exist some agents over-searching and some other agents under-searching. We also discuss related policy implications.

Which corporate bond's yield is more exposed to search frictions? Is the exposure correlated with dealers' intermediation? We propose a measure of bond's misallocation among dealers and show its correlation with bond's liquidity risk which is attributed to search frictions. This measure is defined as the cross-sectional covariance of dealers' private valuations for a bond and their corresponding inventory positions. Using a transaction-level dataset on U.S. corporate bonds, we verify: a higher misallocation is associated with a higher magnitude of liquidity risk. A search-match model with dealers' endogeneous search efforts offers an explanation on this correlation.

Work in progress

Financial Intermediation and Risk Sharing among Heterogeneous Investors

Adverse Selection in Venture Capital Market 

(with Mengbo Zhang)

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